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The U.S. Supreme Court and Parental Rights under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act 
Terrye Conroy, Mitchell L. Yell, Antonis Katsiyannis, and Terri S. Collins 
President Gerald Ford signed the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
(EAHCA) into law in 1975. Since the original passage of the EAHCA, the law has been 
amended four times and renamed the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) 
(See Figure 1). After each revision, the U.S. Department of Education has issued new reg-
ulations implementing the Act (IDEA Regulations, 34 C.F.R. § 300 et seq). The current 
IDEA, as amended, is codified in Title 20 of the United States Code (IDEA, 20 U.S.C. §§ 
1400 et seq.). 
When the EAHCA was being written, the law's authors recognized the importance 
of parents being involved in the development of their child's program of special education. 
In fact, parental involvement has been one of the cornerstones of the law (Yell, Ryan, 
Rozalski & Katsiyannis, 2009). In 2004 Congress emphasized the necessity of meaning-
ful parental involvement in the IDEA's findings and purpose section: 
Almost 30 years of research and experience has demonstrated that the education of children with 
disabilities can be made more effective by-strengthening the role and responsibility of parents 
and ensuring that families of such children have meaningful opportunities to participate in the 
education of their children at school and at home. (IDEA 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (c)(S)(B)) 
Congress believed that access to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) for stu-
dents with disabilities in part depended on their parents' ability to advocate on their child's 
behalf. One purpose of the EAHCA, therefore, was to create specific procedural safe-
guards for parents to ensure that their children would receive a FAPE (Meade & Paige, 
2008). See Table 3 for a list of these safeguards. 
CLAIMS UNDER IDEA AND THE FEDERAL COURT SYSTEM 
Federal law provides that federal courts have jurisdiction for civil claims arising 
under the laws of the United States (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)). Thus, the federal courts 
have jurisdiction over claims under IDEA. IDEA allows an aggrieved party, after exhaust-
ing his or her remedies under the Act, to file a claim in state court or a federal district court 
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Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L, No, 94-142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
Handicapped Children Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372, 100 Stat. 796(1986). 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476, 104 Stat.110 (1990). 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1997). 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647(2004). 
FIGURE 1 
Legislative History of IDEA 
(§ 1415 (1 )(2)(A)). Because claims under IDEA present a 
federal question, if a claim is filed in state court, the defen-
dant may remove the claim to a federal district court as a 
matter of right (28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)). 
through the due process hearing and/or state level hearing, 
either party may appeal the decision to U.S. District Court. 
Each state has between one and four U.S. District Courts. A 
decision at the district court level has authority in the juris-
diction of that court. For example, a decision by the U.S. 
District Court in South Carolina has authority over the entire 
state of South Carolina because there is only one federal dis-
trict court in the state. On the other hand, North Carolina has 
three U.S. District courts (middle district, eastern district, 
and western district). A decision by the district court for the 
middle district of North Carolina has authority only in the 
middle district. 
In the American judicial system, the lowest federal court 
is the U.S. district court. After a claim under IDEA goes 
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Following a decision at this level, a party may appeal the 
decision of the district court to the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, also called the appellate court. Thirteen circuits 
comprise the U.S. courts of appeals (28 U.S.C. § 1295 
(2006)). The appellate court has jurisdiction over a larger 
area than does a district court. So, for example, if an IDEA 
case were appealed from the U.S. District Court of South 
Carolina, the case would be heard by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit has jurisdiction over the states of 
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
West Virginia. 
A ruling from the 13 circuits can be appealed to our 
court of last resort-the United States Supreme Court (28 
U.S.C. § 1254 (2006)). Filing an appeal is referred to as fil-
ing a writ of certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court deter-
mines whether the court will hear a case, called granting 
certiorari. If the case is heard, the ruling of the U.S. 
Supreme Court is the law of the land. Because one of the 
primary purposes of certiorari jurisdiction is uniformity 
among federal courts of appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court 
often grants certiorari when decisions of federal courts of 
appeal conflict on the same matter of federal law. Although 
Supreme Court Rule 10 states that such review by the Court 
is a matter of judicial discretion and will be granted only for 
''compelling reasons," subsection (a) provides that, in exer-
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cising its discretion, the Court wi11 consider that a U.S. court 
of appeals decision is in conflict with another U.S. court of 
appeals decision on the "same important matter" (Gress-
man, Gell, Shapiro, Bishop, & Hartnett, 2007). 
the EAHCA was enacted in 1975, the United States Supreme 
Court has decided 11 cases affecting parental rights and 
IDEA, four of which were decided since 2005 (See Table 1 ). 
In this article we discuss the most recent of these cases. 
Ruli ngs of the U.S. Supreme Court interpreting federal 
laws such as IDEA settle such conflicts by setting precedent 
that, according to the common law doctrine of stare decisis, 
must be followed by every state and federal court in the 
United States (Black's Law Dictionary, 2009, p. 1537). Since 
FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION (FAPE) 
A key purpose of IDEA is to ensure a FAPE is provided 
to all students with disabilities who are eligible for special 
TABLE 1 
U.S. Supreme Court Cases Affecting Parental Rights 
Case Name 
Board of Education v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
Irving Independent School 
District v. Tatro, 
468 U.S. 883 (1984). 
Smith v. Robinson, 
468 U.S. 992 (1984). 
Town of Burlington v. 
Department of Education, 
471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
Honig v. Doe, 
484 U.S. 305 (1988). 
Florence County School 
District Four v. Carter, 
510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
Cedar Rapids Community 
School District v. Garret F., 
526 U.S. 66 (1999). 
Schaffer v. Weast, 
546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
Arlington Central School 
District Board of Education v. 
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006). 
Winkelman v. Parma City 
School District, 
550 U.S. 516 (2007). 
Forest Grove School 
District v. T.A., 
129 S.Ct. 2484 (2009). 
Decision/Holding 
An IEP is adequate to provide a child with a FAPE if the state has complied with IDEA 
procedures and the IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educa-
tional benefits. 
Parents are entitled to a related service for their child if the service is a supportive 
service and not a medical service (other than for diagnosis or evaluation) that must be 
provided by a licensed physician. 
Parents must exhaust their administrative remedies under IDEA before commencing a 
civil action in court. The EAHCA (now IDEA) was amended the next year to include an 
exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement (§1415(1)). 
Courts may award parents reimbursement for the cost of private school as "relief as the 
court determines appropriate" under IDEA when the public school fails to provide a 
FAPE and private school placement is appropriate. 
The stay-put provision of IDEA applied during the pendency of disciplinary review 
proceedings, without an emergency exception for dangerous behaviors. IDEA was later 
amended to include 45-day unilateral alternative placements for certain behaviors. 
Courts may award parents reimbursement for the cost of private school when the public 
school proposes an inappropriate IEP and the private school provides an appropriate 
education but does not meet state standards. 
Affirmed its ruling in Tatro, holding that one-on-one nursing services are included as a 
related service under IDEA. IDEA does not include a hardship exemption for related 
services based on cost. 
Parents have the burden of persuasion in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP 
whenever they are the party seeking relief. 
Parents who prevail in an IDEA action may not recover expert witness fees as part of 
their costs under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) of IDEA. 
Parents can prosecute their own IDEA claims in federal court prose (without an 
attorney) because IDEA grants parents independent, enforceable rights relating to 
procedural and reimbursement matters as well as entitlement to a free appropriate public 
education for their child. 
Courts may reimburse parents for the cost of private school if all criteria are met even 
when their child has not previously received special education services from the public 
school system. 
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education services(§ 1400(d)(l )(A)). IDEA defines a FAPE 
as special education and related services at public expense 
in compliance with state educational agency standards and 
the child's individualized education program (IEP) (§ 1401 
(9)). Two U.S. Supreme Court cases, 25 years apart, illus-
trate the development of the role of parents in the provision 
of a FAPE for their children. They are Board of Education v. 
Rowley (1982) and Winkelman v. Parma City School District 
(2007). 
Board of Education of Hendrick Hudson Central 
School District v. Rowley (1982) 
In 1982, in its first ruling interpreting the EAHCA, the 
U.S. Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Rowley set the 
standard for determining whether an IEP is adequate to pro-
vide a child with a FAPE. In ruling that a sign language 
interpreter was not required for Amy Rowley, the Court rea-
soned that an appropriate education is one that provides 
meaningful access to public education and that meaningful 
means an education sufficient to confer some educational 
benefit (Yell, Katsiyannis, & Hazelkorn, 2007). In Rowley 
the High Court established a two-part test for courts to use in 
reviewing IDEA disputes: " (1) Has the state complied with 
the procedures set forth in the IDEA; and (2) Is the IEP rea-
sonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational 
benefits" (Board of Education v. Rowley, 1982, pp. 206-207). 
Rather than impose a precise definition of what consti-
tutes an appropriate education on the states, the Supreme 
Court focused on the protections provided by the procedural 
safeguards in the EAHCA "giving parents and guardians a 
large measure of participation at every stage of the adminis-
trative process" (Board of Education v. Rowley, 1982, p. 
205). The Court reasoned that: 
entrusting a child 's education to state and local agencies does 
not leave the child without protection. Congress sought to 
protect individual children by providing for parental involve-
ment in the development of state plans and policies ... and in 
the formulation of the child's individual education program .... 
As this very case demonstrates, parents and guardians will 
not lack ardor in seeking to ensure that handicapped chil-
dren receive all the benefits to which they are entitled by the 
Act. (Board of Education v. Rowley, 1982, p. 208) 
It was obvious that the justices on the highest court in the 
U.S. believed that parental participation in the IEP process 
was extremely important. 
Winkelman v. Parma City School District (2007) 
On May 21, 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled on the 
case Winkelman v. Parma City School District. In this case, 
the high court addressed the rights of parents under IDEA to 
pursue claims on their own behalf in federal court, without 
an attorney. 
Facts of the Case 
Jacob Winkelman was a 6-year-old boy with autism spec-
trum disorder whose parents disagreed with the Parma City 
School District's proposed IEP that would have placed 
Jacob in a public elementary school. After requesting an 
impartial due process hearing claiming that the school dis-
trict failed to provide Jacob with a FAPE and after unsuc-
cessfully appealing the hearing officer's decision in favor of 
the school district to a state-level review officer, Jacob's par-
ents filed a complaint on their own behalf and on behalf of 
Jacob to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Ohio. Their complaint alleged that the school district failed 
to follow procedures mandated by IDEA and failed to pro-
vide Jacob with a FAPE. The Winkelmans sought a reversal 
of the hearing officer's administrative decision for the 
school district. The federal district court ruled in favor of the 
school district based on the administrative record (Winkel-
man v. Parma City School District, 2005). The parents 
appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
In their appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Winkelmans argued 
that the ruling of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit's in Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School District 
(2003) that parents could assert IDEA claims on their own 
behalf because the Act conferred joint rights upon both par-
ent and child. The Sixth Circuit court disagreed, however, 
relying on its reasoning in Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local 
School District (2005) and dismissed the Winkelmans' 
appeal until they obtained counsel for their son Jacob 
(Winkelman v. Parma City School District, 2005, p. 407). 
In its Cavanaugh decision that same year, the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that IDEA did not grant parents the right to repre-
sent their child in federal court without committing the 
unauthorized practice of law, nor could parents pursue their 
own substantive IDEA claim without an attorney, which is 
ca11ed pro se representation, because the Act did not grant 
parents a substantive right to have their child receive a 
FAPE (2005). Although clearly under IDEA the eligible 
child has the right to receive a FAPE, the court held that the 
child's parents did not have this right for their child. 
The Unauthorized Practice of Law & 
Pro Se Representation 
The Sixth Circuit held that Jacob's parents had engaged 
in the unauthorized practice of law or prose representation. 
The unauthorized practice of law has been defined as "the 
practice of law by a person, typically a nonlawyer, who has 
not been licensed or admitted to practice in a given jurisdic-
tion." The practice of law includes "conducting cases in 
court." The term pro se refers to "one who represents one-
self in a court proceeding without the assistance of a 
lawyer" (Black's Law Dictionary, 2009, p. 1341 ). 
Jacob's parents appealed the Sixth Circuit's decision to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to settle the disagreement among the Courts of 
Appeals (See Table 2) regarding the rights of nonattorney 
parents to prosecute IDEA actions in federal court. 
The Supreme Court 
On May 21, 2007, the U.S . Supreme Court ruled that the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the 
Winkelmans's appeal for lack of counsel because "IDEA 
grants parents independent, enforceable rights" including 
not only rights related to certain procedural and reimburse-
ment matters but also the "entitlement to a free appropriate 
public education" for their child (Winkelman v. Parma City 
School District, 2007, p. 533). 
Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion of the Court. The 
question presented was whether nonattorney parents could 
proceed in federal court without an attorney, either on their 
own behalf or as representatives of their child. Justice 
Kennedy explained that, to resolve the issue, the Court 
needed to examine the provisions of IDEA to determine 
whether the Act gives parents rights of their own that they 
can pursue in court or whether it allows them, because of 
their status as parents, to represent their child (p. 520); and, 
that the answer lay in interpreting IDEA's entire statutory 
scheme, beginning with one of the purposes of the Act-"to 
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and par-
ents of such children are protected" (Winkelman v. Parma 
City School District, 2007, p. 523). 
In its analysis of the IDEA's procedural safeguards, the 
Court characterized the parental right to a FAPE as follows: 
A central purpose of the parental protections is to facilitate 
the provision of a "free appropriate public education," 
§ 140 I (9), which must be made available "in conformity 
with the [IEP]," § 140 I (9){D). The Act defines a " free appro-
priate public education" pursuant to an IEP to be an educa-
tional instruction "specially designed ... to meet the unique 
needs of a child with a disability," § 140 I (29), coupled with 
any additional "related services" that are required to assist a 
child with a disability to benefit from [that instruction] ," 
§J401(26)(A). See also §1401(9). {p. 524) 
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As noted by Justice Kennedy in the Supreme Court opin-
ion, federal law (28 § U.S.C. 1654 (2006)) specifically allows 
a party to represent his or her own interests (to proceed pro 
se) in federal court. The problem faced by the Winkelmans 
was that the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held they could 
not proceed on their own behalf without an attorney because 
IDEA did not give them substantive rights as parents to a 
FAPE for their child, and, because they were not attorneys, 
they could not practice law by representing their child's 
rights in court. Upon examining both the text and structure 
of IDEA, the Supreme Court concluded that IDEA conveys 
enforceable rights upon parents as well as their children; 
that such rights continue beyond the administrative stage 
entitling a parent to be a "party aggrieved" in federal court 
(p. 527); and that those rights encompass procedural, reim-
bursement, and substantive matters, that is, the right to a 
FAPE for their child (p. 533). 
PARENTAL RIGHTS & THE SUPREME COURT 
In Winkelman v. Parma City School District (2007), Jus-
tice Kennedy outlined various provisions of IDEA that 
TABLE 2 
Circuit Split on Nonattorney Parents & the Unauthorized Practice of Law pre Winkelman 
Circuit 
First Circuit 
Second Circuit 
Third Circuit 
Sixth Circuit 
Seventh Circuit 
Eleventh Circuit 
Opinion 
Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Regional School 
District, 346 F. 3d 24 7 (1st Cir. 2003). 
Wenger v. Canastota Central School 
District, 146 F. 3d 123 (2nd Cir. 1998). 
Collinsgru v. Palmyra Board of Education, 
161 F. 3d 225 (3rd Cir. 1998). 
Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local School 
District, 409 F. 3d 753 (6th Cir. 2005). 
Mosely v. Board of Education of Chicago, 
434 F. 3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006). 
Devine v. Indian River County School 
Board, 121 F. 3d 576 (11th Cir. 1997). 
Position 
Parents were "parties aggrieved" and could sue pro se 
for substantive and procedural matters. 
Parent who was not attorney could not appear prose 
on behalf of his son. 
Nonattorney parents had no right to represent child and 
lacked substantive rights of their own. 
Nonattorney parents could not represent their child and 
did not share the right to a FAPE with their child. 
Parent could sue for her own procedural rights but not 
substantive rights of her child . 
Nonattorney parent did not have the right to represent 
his son. 
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"mandate or otherwise describe parental involvement" in 
four areas: (1) procedures for developing a child's IEP, (2) 
criteria governing the sufficiency of the child's education, 
(3) mechanisms for review when objecting to the IEP or 
other IDEA proceedings, and (4) reimbursement of expenses 
(Winkelman, 2007, p. 523) (See Table 3). 
Following is a discussion of United States Supreme 
Court decisions affecting parental rights since the passage of 
the EAHCA in 1975 (IDEA) in the four categories outlined 
by the Supreme Court in Winkelman. 
(1) PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED WHEN 
DEVELOPING A CHILD'S IEP 
In the Winkelman case, the U.S. Supreme Court outlined 
the procedures mandated by IDEA when developing a child's 
IEP (See Table 3). The court's opinion also cited its 2005 
decision in Schaffer v. Weast, which stressed the significant 
role that parents play in the IEP process. We next briefly 
examine the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in this case. 
Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 
The Schaffer v. Weast (2005) decisions placed the burden 
of persuasion on parents challenging the sufficiency of their 
child's IEP. Many scholars have considered this case to be a 
setback for parents of students with disabilities (Meade & 
Paige, 2008), except for the High Court's focus on the sig-
nificance of parental involvement in the IEP process under 
IDEA (Winkelman, 2007, p. 524). In the Schaffer decisions, 
Justice O'Conner wrote, "the core of the statute, however, is 
the cooperative process that it establishes between parents 
and schools" (Schaffer v. Weast, 2005, p. 53). 
2) CRITERIA GOVERNING THE SUFFICIENCY OF 
AN EDUCATION PROVIDED TO A CHILD 
One of the main purposes of IDEA is to assist states in 
providing a FAPE for all children with disabilities and to 
ensure that the rights of children with disabilities and their 
parents are protected in the process (§ 1400(d)(1 )(A)-(C)). 
To receive federal funds under the Act, states must demon-
strate that they have a framework in place to accomplish 
these goals (§§ 1411-1412). IDEA defines FAPE to include 
special education and related services (§ 1401 (9)). Special 
education is defined as "specially designed instruction, at 
no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child with 
a disability"(§ 1401 (29)). Related services, which are often 
an important components of a student 's FAPE, are 
described as " transportation , and such developmental , cor-
rective, and supportive services . .. as may be required to 
assist a child with a disability to benefit from special edu-
cation" (§ 1401(26)). 
(3) MECHANISMS FOR REVIEW WHEN OBJECT-
ING TO THE IEP OR OTHER IDEA PROCEEDINGS 
IDEA ensures a FAPE for all students wi th disabilities 
who are determined to be eligible for special education 
services (§ 1400(d)(1 )(A)). The heart of a student's FAPE 
is his or her individualized education program (IEP) 
(§ 1414(d)). The law also contains procedural safeguards 
by which parents can challenge the school district's pro-
posed IEP if they believe it to be insufficient. Ultimately, 
if parents and school district officials cannot settle their 
differences, IDEA provides for an impartial due process 
hearing (§ 1415(f)). IDEA does not, however, assign the 
burden of persuasion at such a due process hearing to any 
particular party. 
The Burden of Proof 
To prevail in a legal proceeding, after both sides have 
presented their evidence, the party with the burden of 
persuasion must have convinced the trier of fact (e.g., the 
due process hearing officer or judge) of the ex istence of cer-
tain facts (Mueller & Kirkpatrick, 2003). The burden of per-
suasion is important because the party who is allocated the 
burden will lose if the hearing officer or judge is not per-
suaded by the evidence they present. The burden of persua-
sion becomes particularly significant when the trier of fact 
is uncertain how to rule because the evidence presented by 
both sides is equally convincing (McCormick, 1999). 
Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 
In Schaffer v. Weast (2005), the Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of which party would bear the burden of persua-
sion in a due process hearing when an IEP is challenged 
under IDEA. 
Brian Schaffer was a student with learning di sabilities 
(LD) and a speech-language impairment. Brian 's parents 
believed that the middle school placement offered by the 
Montgomery County Public School System (MCPS) lacked 
the smaller classes and intensive services that Brian needed; 
therefore, they enrolled him in a private school and initiated a 
due process hearing seeking compensation from the MCPS 
for their private school expenses (Schaffer v. Weast, 2005, p. 
533). The administrative law judge (ALJ) who presided over 
the hearing determined that the evidence presented by the 
parties at the hearing was equally compelling; therefore, his 
ruling would depend on which party bore the burden of per-
suasion. After deciding that the burden of persuasion 
belonged to Brian's parents because they challenged the IEP, 
the ALJ found that the Schaffers had not met their burden and 
ruled in favor of the school district. Brian's parents appealed 
the ALJ 's ruling to the U .S. District Court in Maryland. The 
district court reversed the ALJ's decision, finding that the 
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TABLE 3 
U.S. Supreme Court in Winkelman: Parental Rights Under IDEA 
Parental Rights 
Procedures to be followed when developing a child's IEP 
School district must develop an IEP for each child with a disability. 
Parents must play a significant role. 
Parents serve as members of the IEP team. 
Concerns of parents must be considered by the IEP team. 
The IEP team must revise the IEP when appropriate to address certain 
information by the parents. 
States must ensure that parents serve as part of any group making 
placement decisions for their child. 
General procedural safeguards 
States must develop procedures to guarantee safeguards regarding the 
provision of a FAPE. 
Parents must be provided an opportunity to examine all relevant records. 
Criteria governing the sufficiency of an education provided to a child 
A central purpose of the parental protections is to facilitate the provision 
of a FAPE. 
The Act defines "free appropriate public education" as special education 
and related services that are provided in conformity with the IEP. 
Special education means specially designed instruction ... to meet the 
needs of a child with a disability. 
Related services are coupled with specially designed instruction to assist 
a child with a disability to benefit from that special education. 
Special education and related services must be provided under public 
supervision and direction; meet the standards of the State educational 
agency; and include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or 
secondary school education in the state involved at no cost to the parents. 
Mechanisms for review when objecting to the IEP or other IDEA proceedings 
Parents must be given the opportunity to present a complaint if they object to 
the identification, evaluation, placement, or provision of a FAPE for their child. 
The process of review begins with a preliminary meeting where parents may 
discuss their complaint and the local education agency is provided the 
opportunity to resolve the matter. 
If the complaint is not resolved to their satisfaction, parents may request an 
impartial due process hearing before a hearing officer. 
Hearing officer decisions must comply with certain standards regarding the 
provision of a FAPE and matters alleging procedural violations. 
Parents may appeal to the state educational agency if they disagree with 
the local agency's decision. 
Parents may bring a civil action in federal court if they disagree with the 
state's decision. 
Reimbursement of expenses 
Parents may be reimbursed for the cost of private school if the state fails to 
make a FAPE available for their child. 
A prevailing party who is a parent of a child with a disability may be awarded 
attorneys fees. 
Statutory Provision 
§§ 1412(a)(4) & 1414(d) 
Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005). 
§ 1414(d)(1 )(B)(i) 
§ 1414(d)(3)(A)(ii) 
§ 1414 (d)(4)(A) 
§ 1414(e) 
§ 1415(a) 
§ 1415(b)(1) 
§ 1401 (9) & § 1401 (9) (D) 
§ 1401 (29) 
§ 1401 (26)(A) 
§ 1401 (9) (A)-(C); § 1401 (29) 
§1415(b)(6) 
§ 1415(f)(1 )(B 
§ 1415(f)(1 )(A) 
§ 1415(f)(3)(E)(i)-(ii) 
§ 141 5(g)(1) 
§ 1415(i)(1) & § 1415(i)(2)(A) 
§ 1412(a)(1 O)(C)(ii) 
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) 
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burden of persuasion as to the adequacy of the initial IEP 
should have been placed on the school district and remanded 
the case back to the ALJ (Brian S. v. Vance, 2000). 
The school district appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court 
of Appeals, but, before the Fourth Circuit could hear the 
appeal, the ALJ ruled that, with the burden now on the 
school district, the district had failed to prove the adequacy 
of its IEP. The school district again appealed the ALJ's deci-
sion to the U.S. District Court, and the district court again 
placed the burden of persuasion on the school district (Weast 
v. Schaffer, 2002). The school district appealed to the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals for a second time. The Fourth Cir-
cuit held that the district court erred in assigning the burden 
of proof to the school district and reversed the decision 
(Weast v. Schaffer, 2004). 
The Fourth Circuit 
In support of its decision to allocate the burden of per-
suasion to Brian's parents, the Fourth Circuit relied on what 
it referred to as the "normal rule": When a statute, such as 
IDEA, is silent as to the burden of persuasion , the burden is 
normally placed on the party initiating the proceeding and 
seeking relief (Weast v. Schaffer, 2004, p. 453). Because 
Brian's parents initiated the proceeding challenging his IEP, 
the burden of persuasion would be placed on them. The 
court recognized that the circuit courts of appeal disagreed 
as to which party assumed the burden of persuasion under 
IDEA; however, it was not persuaded by what it character-
ized as "little or no analysis" (p. 453) by those circuits that 
assigned the burden to the school districts. Therefore, the 
court declined to depart from the "normal rule" of allocating 
the burden of persuasion to the party seeking relief and 
placed the burden of persuasion on Brian Schaffer's parents 
(p. 453). 
Brian's parents maintained that because of their greater 
expertise and resources, school districts have the natural 
advantage in IEP disputes and therefore should bear the bur-
den of persuasion. The Fourth Circuit responded that Congress 
addressed this natural advantage by establ ishing procedural 
safeguards in IDEA to "level the playing fi eld" (p. 453). The 
court also suggested that Congress could take remedial steps if 
experience shows that parents do not have access to sufficient 
expertise (p. 453). That is, Congress could amend IDEA. 
Table 4 shows the split decisions among the circuit courts. 
The Supreme Court 
Brian Schaffer's parents appealed to the U.S . Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the 
case, and, on November 14, 2005, in a 6-2 decision, it 
affirmed the Fourth Circuit's deci sion placing the burden of 
persuasion on the parents challenging the IEP. 
The Court explained that in a statutory cause of action, it 
would first look to the statute itself. If the statute was silent 
regarding which party had the burden, as was IDEA, the 
Court would begin with the "ordinary default rule that plain-
tiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims" (Mueller 
& Kirkpatrick, 2003, p. 104). 
Noting that decisions placing the entire burden of per-
suasion on the opposing party at the outset of a proceeding 
were extremely rare, the Supreme Court held that "absent 
some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise . .. 
we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it 
usually falls , upon the party seeking relief' (Schaffer v. 
Weast, 2005, pp. 57-58). 
TABLE 4 
Circuits Split on the Burden of Persuasion pre Schaffer v. Weast (2005) 
Burden on Parents 
Fourth Circuit 
Fifth Circuit 
Sixth Circuit 
Tenth Circuit 
Weast v. Schaffer, 377 F. 3d 449 (4th Cir. 2004). 
Alamo Heights Independent School District v. State Board of Education, 790 F. 2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1986). 
Cordrey v. Euckert, 917 F. 2d 1460 (6th Cir. 1990). 
Johnson v. Independent School District No. 4, 921 F. 2d 1022 (10th Cir.1990). 
Burden on School District 
Second Circuit 
Third Circuit 
Eighth Circuit 
Ninth Circuit 
D.C. Circuit 
Walczak v. Florida Union Free School District, 142 F. 3d 119 (2d Cir. 1998). 
Carlisle Area School District v. Scott P., 62 F. 3d 520, (3d Cir. 1995). 
E.S. v. Independent School District No. 196, 135 F. 3d 566 (8th Cir. 1998). 
Clyde K. v. Puyallup School District No. 3, 35 F. 3d 1396 (9th Cir. 1994). 
McKenzie v. Smith, 771 F. 2d 1527, 1532 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
Justice O'Conner, writing for the majority, explained that 
the Court's ruling should be construed narrowly to the case 
at hand. The Court held: 
The burden of proof in an administrative hearing chal-
lenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking 
relief. In this case, that party is Brian, as represented by his 
parents. But the rule applies with equal effect to school 
districts: If they seek to challenge an IEP, they will in tum 
bear the burden of persuasion before an ALJ. (Schaffer v. 
Weast, 2005, p. 62) 
Ginsburg & Breyer Dissent 
Though recognizing that courts ordinarily allocate the 
burden of proof to the initiating party seeking relief, Justice 
Ginsburg was persuaded that factors such as policy consid-
erations, convenience, and fairness required that the burden 
of proof be assigned to the school district. She distinguished 
IDEA from typical civil rights legislation (e.g., the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act), where parties must allege and 
prove discrimination or their qualification for statutory ben-
efits, explaining that IDEA "casts an affirmative, benefi-
ciary-specific obligation on providers of public education" 
designed to overcome past neglect and disregard encoun-
tered by children with disabilities seeking access (p. 64). 
Justice Ginsburg reasoned that school districts are charged 
with offering each student with a disability an IEP to meet 
his or her special needs; therefore, they should be called 
upon to demonstrate the adequacy of the IEP. She further 
argued that school districts are far better equipped to demon-
strate that they have fulfilled their obligation under the 
IDEA than are the parents of students with disabilities to 
show that the schools have not met their obligations under 
the law. Justice Ginsburg pointed out that it is the school dis-
tricts that are familiar with the services available and have 
experience with students with similar disabilities (p. 64) and 
that the majority of parents lack the knowledge and sophisti-
cation to mount an effective case against the district. Justice 
Ginsburg quotes Judge Luttig in his Fourth Circuit dissent: 
"In this setting, "the party with the bigger guns also has bet-
ter access to information, greater expertise, and an affirma-
tive obligation to provide the contested services"' (Weast v. 
Schaffer, 2004, p. 458, cited in Schaffer v. Weast, 2005, p. 67). 
Justice Breyer argued in his di ssent that, despite IDEA's 
detailed procedural scheme, the law is silent as to who bears 
the burden of persuasion in administrative hearings; there-
fore, Congress left it for the states to decide the issue. He also 
pointed to IDEA's provisions that assign the establishment 
of procedures for the hearing to the state and its agencies (20 
U.S.C. §14 15(f)(l)(A)). Because the ALJ in Brian Schaf-
fer's case looked for a federal rather than a state burden of 
persuasion, Justice Breyer would have remanded the case 
back to the ALJ to determine how Maryland administrative 
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law would assign the burden of persuasion (Schaffer v. 
Weast, 2005, p. 7 I). In fact, Justice Ginsburg notes in her 
dissent that nine states submitted amicus curiae (friend of 
the court) briefs urging the Supreme Court to place the bur-
den of persuasion on the school district, because to do so 
would best serve the purpose of IDEA (p. 66). 
Justice Breyer submitted that should a lack of uniformity 
among the states become problematic, the U.S. Department 
of Education could promulgate a uniform federal standard, 
thereby limiting state choice. In support of allowing the 
state's ALJ to determine how state administrative proce-
dures and state laws would apply the burden, Justice Breyer 
emphasized Congress's representation of IDEA as an exer-
cise in "cooperative federalism" (pp. 70-71 ). 
Justice O'Conner, writing for the majority, recognized 
that several state laws or regulations sought to override the 
default rule. The Court, however, did not address whether 
states may override the rule and put the burden of persua-
sion on the school districts, because no such state law 
existed in Maryland at the time. The Court also declined to 
address Justice Breyer's contention in his dissent that the 
states should decide how to allocate the burden of persua-
sion, because no such argument was presented by either 
party (pp. 61-62). 
The Burden Post-Schaff er 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Schaffer in 2005, 
Congress has not addressed the burden of persuasion in 
IDEA claims, and, in its final regulations implementing the 
2004 IDEA amendments (effective August 14, 2006), the 
U.S. Department of Education declined to assign the burden 
of persuasion in due process hearings. Relying on the Schaf-
fer decision, the Department of Education found that "since 
Supreme Court precedent is binding legal authority, further 
regulation in this area is unnecessary. In addition, we are not 
aware of significant questions regarding the burden of pro-
duction that would require regulation" (71 Fed Reg. 46540, 
at 46706). 
Post-Schaffer, some states have amended their laws or 
enacted new legislation to place the burden of persuasion on 
the school district or the parent. Such state-level determina-
tion is argued to be consistent with the holding in Schaffer 
and the spirit of cooperative federalism urged by Justice 
Breyer in his dissent (Freed, 2009). Freed submits that the 
Supreme Court may need to revisit the IDEA burden of per-
suasion issue, given the potential for a split in the circuits 
after federal courts interpret Schaffer in states that assign the 
burden to school districts by state law (2009, p. 125). For 
example, in M.M. v. Special School District No. 1 (2008), 
the Eighth Circuit held that the Supreme Court 's decision in 
Schaffer and its earlier decision in School Board of indepen-
dent School District No. 11 v. Renollett (2006) preempted 
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Minnesota law that placed the burden of persuasion in a due 
process hearing on the school district. Nevertheless, the 
Supreme Court declined to review that decision (certiorari 
denied in M.M. v. Special School District No. 1, 129 S. Ct. 
452 (2008)). If necessary, Congress could amend IDEA to 
assign the burden of persuasion in due process hearings. 
The desire to place the burden of persuasion in due 
process hearings on the school district may be stronger in 
those states where free or low-cost legal assistance for par-
ents is practically nonexistent. Parents in such settings are 
forced to navigate alone an intimidating legal process 
replete with complicated procedures, legalese, and acronyms 
against school districts that are equipped with experience, 
expertise, and their own attorneys, that is, "the bigger guns" 
(Weast v. Schaffer, 2004, p. 458). 
Parents today, faced with both the burden of persuasion 
and the school districts' "natural advantage" (Schaffer, 2005, 
p. 60), may need more than ever to depend on the strength 
of expert witnesses to prevail in a due process hearing. Par-
ents who do prevail, however, cannot seek reimbursement 
for the cost of that expert's testimony (Arlington Central 
School District Board of Education v. Murphy (2006); 
Thomason, 2007). See section (4) Reimbursement of 
Expenses. 
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The IDEA procedural safeguards emphasized by the U.S. 
Supreme Court from Rowley (1982) to Winkelman (2007) 
include the right of parents to present a complaint if they 
object to the identification, evaluation, placement, or provi-
sion of a FAPE for their child (§ 1415(b )(6)). After a prelim-
inary meeting for parents to discuss their complaint and for 
the local educational agency to attempt to resolve the mat-
ter, if an agreement is not reached, parents may proceed to 
an impartial due process hearing before a hearing officer(§§ 
1415(f)(l)(A) &(B)). Parents who disagree with the hearing 
officer's decision may appeal to the state educational agency 
(§ 1415(g)(1)). Some states, however, have only a one-tiered 
due process hearing system. Only after the administrative 
process is complete may parents who disagree with the 
state's decision file a civil action in court (§1415(i)(1) & 
§ 1415(i)(2)(A)). 
REPRESENTING YOURSELF IN COURT-
WINKELMAN V. PARMA CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT (2007) 
Once parents exhaust the administrative remedies avail-
able to them under the IDEA, they may file a civil action in 
state court or federal district court (§1415(1)(2)(A)). The 
Supreme Court in Winkelman v. Parma City School District 
(2007) ruled that parents can pursue their own claims in 
federal court without an attorney because they possess pro-
cedural, reimbursement, and substantive rights under IDEA, 
in other words, the right to a FAPE for their child (p. 533). 
Although the decision was hailed as a victory for parental 
rights under the IDEA, as Mead and Paige suggested, in 
practice it "may turn out to be something of a hollow vic-
tory" if parents going up against experienced school district 
attorneys lose more often than they win (Mead & Paige, 
2008). In fact, parents of children receiving special educa-
tion and related services typically do not possess the knowl-
edge and ability necessary to effectively advocate for their 
children on their own (Phillips, 2008; Wakelin, 2008). Fur-
thermore, the Supreme Court's Schaffer v. Weast (2005) deci-
sion places the burden of persuasion on parents when they do 
seek relief. The current fee-shifting provisions of IDEA open 
up the possibility that the parents could be held responsible 
for the district's attorneys' fees(§ 1415(i)(3)(B) (i)(Ill)). And 
the Supreme Court has determined that parents cannot 
recoup their expert witness fees when they do prevail in an 
IDEA action (Arlington v. Murphy, 2006). See section (4) 
Reimbursement of Expenses. Moreover, when the Supreme 
Court declined to address the Winkelmans ' alternative argu-
ment that IDEA gives parents the right to prosecute claims 
(without an attorney) on their child's behalf (p. 535), the 
Court may have created an area of uncertainty for parents 
pursuing a FAPE for their child (Hagdorn, 2009; Kerr, 2009). 
( 4) REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES 
In Schaffer v. Weast (2005), the Supreme Court placed the 
burden of persuasion in due process hearings on the party 
seeking relief-typically the parent (Schaffer, 2005, pp. 
53-54 ). In doing so, the Court was not persuaded by what it 
described as the parents' "most plausible argument"-that 
considerations of fairness require that the burden not be 
placed on a party to establish "facts peculiarly within the 
knowledge of his adversary," the school district (Schaffer, 
2005, p. 60). Justice O'Conner explained that Congress 
addressed the "natural advantage" of school districts in 
information and expertise by requiring them to safeguard 
the procedural rights of parents and to share information 
with them (p. 60); therefore parents are "not left to challenge 
the government without a realistic opportunity to access the 
necessary evidence, or without an expert with the firepower 
to match the opposition" (p. 61 ). However, soon after its 
decision in Schaffer, the Supreme Court ruled in Arlington 
Central School District Board of Education v. Murphy 
(2006) that the costs recoverable by the prevailing party 
under IDEA do not include the payment of expert witness 
fees. For parents who typically bear the burden of persua-
sion in IDEA actions, the Supreme Court may have further 
diminished their bargaining strength (Mead & Paige, 2008). 
Arlington Central School District Board of Education 
v. Murphy (2006) 
Pearl and Theodore Murphy prevailed in their IDEA 
action seeking to require the Arlington Central School Dis-
trict Board of Education to pay for their son Joseph's private 
school tuition. The Murphys requested reimbursement for 
the fees they paid an educational consultant to assist them 
with their IDEA action. The U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York found that the Murphys were 
entitled to compensation for $8,650 in expert fees pursuant 
to the fee shifting provision of IDEA. Section 1415(i)(3)(B) 
provides for "reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs" 
to prevailing parents. The school district appealed the attor-
neys' fee award to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Recognizing that the Circuits disagreed regarding expert 
fees, the Second Circuit found that when Congress added 
the attorneys' fees provision in 1986, it intended to include 
expert fees as part of a prevailing party's costs (Murphy v. 
Arlington Central School District Board of Education, 
2005). Table 5 shows the split decisions among the circuit 
courts. 
The Supreme Court 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari "to resolve 
the conflict among the Circuits with respect to whether Con-
gress authorized the compensation of expert fees to prevail-
ing parents in IDEA actions" (Arlington Central School Dis-
trict Board of Education v. Murphy, 2006, p. 295). The 
Court held that it does not (p. 304). Writing for the Major-
ity, Justice Alito reasoned that because IDEA was enacted 
pursuant to the Spending Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
(Art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ), which allows Congress to impose condi-
tions upon states accepting federal funds, there must be 
"clear notice regarding the liability at issue," or that expert 
fees may be awarded under the Act (Arlington v. Murphy, 
2006, p. 297). The Supreme Court determined that the Act 
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failed to provide such notice by use of the word "costs." The 
Court was not persuaded by the Murphys argument that 
Congress intended to include expert fees as part of the 
"costs" incurred by the prevailing parent, as evidenced by 
the language the Conference Committee used in its report 
upon passage of the bill: 
The conferees intend that the term 'attorneys' fees as part of 
the costs' include reasonable expenses and fees of expert 
witnesses and the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation 
which is found to be necessary for the preparation of the par-
ent or guardian's case in the action or proceeding, as well as 
traditional costs incurred in the course of litigating a case. 
(H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-687, at 5, 1986) 
Justice Alito wrote "legislative history is simply not 
enough"; the key is not what a majority of both Houses 
intended, but what they put in the text of the law (p. 304). 
The Majority was also not convinced by the Murphys' 
contention that to include expert fees as part of the costs to 
prevailing parents would further the goals of IDEA-to 
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to 
them a FAPE and that the rights of parents to challenge school 
district decisions are safeguarded. Justice Alito responded 
that IDEA is not intended to further such goals in all 
instances "at the expense of fiscal considerations" (p. 303). 
The Dissent 
Justice Breyer wrote for the Dissent that there are "two 
strong reasons to interpret the phrase in the IDEA to include 
expert fees: (1) that it was what Congress intended; and (2) 
that it furthers the purposes defined in the IDEA" (p. 309). 
Justice Breyer details the legislative history of the addition of 
the attorneys' fees provision in IDEA, quoting the language 
of the Conference Report. He then stresses that the goals of 
IDEA encourage parent participation, stating that "the prac-
tical significance of the Act's participatory rights and proce-
dural protections may be seriously diminished if parents are 
TABLE 5 
Burden on Parents 
Circuit 
Second Circuit 
District of Columbia 
Eighth Circuit 
Seventh Circuit 
Circuits Split on Expert Fees pre Arlington v. Murphy (2006) 
Citation 
Arlington v. Murphy, 402 F. 3d 332 (2d Cir. 2005). 
Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F. 3d 70 (DC Cir. 2005). 
Neosho R-V School Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315 F. 3d 1022 
(8th Cir. 2003). 
T. D. v. LaGrange School Dist. No. 102, 349 F. 3d 469 (7th Cir. 2003). 
Ruling 
Expert fees allowed 
Expert fees NOT allowed 
Expert fees NOT allowed 
Expert fees NOT allowed 
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unable to obtain reimbursement of the costs of their experts" 
(pp. 313-314). Justice Breyer pointed to studies that show 
both the necessity of experts in IDEA cases and the inability 
of parents of children with disabilities to afford such fees. 
He also noted that many of the experts used by school dis-
tricts are already on their staff but that, without potential 
reimbursement, parents may have to do without. Justice 
Breyer stated that the Majority decision to bar reimburse-
ment for expert fees under IDEA "will leave many parents 
and guardians 'without an expert with the firepower to 
match the opposition,'-a far cry from the level playing 
field that Congress envisioned" (pp. 315-316, quoting the 
Court in Schaffer). 
Ginsburg Concurs 
Justice Ginsburg agreed with the result but disagreed 
with the Majority's "repeated references to a Spending 
Clause derived 'clear notice' requirement," noting that 
IDEA was also enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Justice Ginsburg quoted the Supreme 
Court's own language in Smith v. Robinson (1984) that the 
EAHCA (now IDEA) was "set up to aid states in complying 
with their constitutional obligations to provide a public edu-
cation for handicapped children" (p. 305, quoting Smith v. 
Robinson, 1986, p. 992). Stating that the Court's "clear 
notice" "prop" was unnecessary given its own precedent and 
the text of IDEA (p. 306), Justice Ginsburg concluded that 
"the ball ... is properly left in Congress' court" (p. 307). 
THE IDEA FAIRNESS & RESTORATION ACT 
The IDEA Fairness & Restoration Act was introduced in 
the House on June 4, 2009, as HR 2740. The Act would 
override the Supreme Court's decision in Arlington v. Mur-
phy (2006) by amending IDEA to allow parents to recover 
expert witness costs for due process hearings and civil 
actions under IDEA. According to the Council of Parent 
Attorneys and Advocates (COPAA), who filed an amicus 
brief with the Supreme Court in the Arlington v. Murphy 
appeal, the IDEA Fairness & Restoration Act would align 
IDEA with other civil rights legislation, such as the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act, which allow prevailing plaintiffs to recover their expert 
fees. The group also pointed to the Government Account-
ability Office (GAO) study in 2003 that reported only five 
hearings per 10,000 special education students in 2003 
along with the fact that parents must prevail to recover their 
costs (COPAA, 2009). Introduced by Representative Van 
Hollen from Maryland on June 4, 2009, HR 2740 was 
referred to the House Subcommittee on Early Childhood, 
Elementary, and Secondary Education on July 23, 2009 
(THOMAS, Library of Congress). 
When parents request a due process hearing to challenge 
the provision of a FAPE for their child, school districts 
undoubtedly submit their experts' opinions in support of 
their position. The Second Circuit in Murphy v. Arlington 
(2005) described expert testimony as "often critical in IDEA 
cases, which are fact-intensive inquiries about the child's 
disability and the effectiveness of the measures that school 
boards have offered to secure a free appropriate public edu--
cation" (p. 338). In interpreting the IDEA fee shifting provi-
sion to exclude expert fees in Arlington v. Murphy (2006), 
the Supreme Court did not question the necessity of expert 
testimony for parents to mount a successful challenge to a 
school district's decision. In fact, in Schaffer v. Weast 
(2005), when placing the burden of persuasion on parents 
requesting a due process hearing, the Court acknowledged 
the significance of expert testimony (p. 61 ). In Schaffer v. 
Weast (2005), the Court affirmed the Fourth Circuit's deci-
sion to place the burden on the party seeking relief, which 
specifically addressed the necessity for experts: 
For regardless of which side has the burden of proof in an 
administrative hearing, parents will have to offer expert tes-
timony to show that the proposed IEP is inadequate. Shift-
ing the burden of proof, in other words, will not enable par-
ents by themselves to mount a serious, substantive challenge 
to an IEP. Congress recognized that parents need profes-
sional assistance, and the IDEA therefore allows parents 
who prevail in due process hearings to recover their fees for 
hiring lawyers. 20 U .S .C. * I 415(i)(3). If experience shows 
that parents do not have sufficient access to substantive 
expertise under the current statutory scheme, Congress 
should be called upon to take further remedial steps. (Weast 
v. Schaffer, 2004, p. 456) 
An additional consideration was presented by the 
National Disability Rights Network and the Center for Law 
and Education in their amicus brief in Arlington v. Murphy 
(2006). The groups submitted that the need for experts was 
increased by the 2004 IDEA amendments now requiring 
special education to be "based on peer-reviewed research to 
the extent practicable"(§ 1414(d)(l)(A)(i)(IV)); therefore, 
parents must submit evidence of educational options, 
research on generally accepted methodologies, and whether 
the proposed program is accepted and recognized as reason-
able by educational experts (Brief, 2006, p.1 I). Experience 
may in fact show the necessity for Congressional action. 
Forest Grove School District v. T.A. (2009) 
After struggling in school since kindergarten, T.A. was 
evaluated by a school psychologist in his freshman year of 
high school. A school psychologist evaluated him and deter-
mined that T.A. was not eligible for special education ser-
vices. With help from his family, T.A. completed his sopho-
more year, but his problems worsened. A private professional 
diagnosed T.A. with ADHD and a number of disabilities 
relating to learning and memory and recommended a struc-
tured residential learning environment. His parents enrolled 
T.A. in private school, notified the school district of their 
placement, and requested a due process hearing regarding 
his eligibi lity for special education services. The school dis-
trict again evaluated T.A. and concluded that he was not eli-
gible for special education services because his ADHD "did 
not have a sufficiently significant impact on his educational 
performance" (Forest Grove v. T.A., 2009, p. 2489). Because 
the school district determined that T.A. was not eligible for 
special education, they did not offer him an IEP. 
After hearing testimony from numerous expert witnesses, 
the hearing officer found that T.A. was eligible for special 
education services; that the school district failed to identify 
him as eligible and failed to offer T.A. a FAPE; that the pri-
vate school placement was appropriate; and that the school 
district was responsible for reimbursing T.A. 's parents for 
his private school tuition (Forest Grove v. T.A., 2009). The 
school district appealed and the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Oregon set aside the reimbursement award, rul-
ing that the new 1997 statute (§ 1412(a)(IO(C)(ii)) pre-
vented reimbursement for students who had not previously 
received special education and related services (Forest 
Grove v. T.A., 2005). 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district 
court's decision, finding that students who had not previ-
ously received special education services through the public 
school were eligible for private school tuition reimburse-
ment just as they were before the 1997 IDEA amendments 
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as "appropriate" relief under § 1415(1 )(2)(C) and that the 
new statute (IDEA §1412(a)(]O)(C)) did not apply (Forest 
Grove v. T.A., 2008, pp. 1087-1088). 
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle a 
split in the federal circuits (See Table 6) "to determine 
whether § 1412(a)( lO(C) establishes a categorical bar to 
tuition reimbursement for students who have not previously 
received special education services under the authority of a 
public education agency" (Forest Grove, 2009, p. 2490). In 
a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court held that it does not. Not-
ing that the Burlington and Carter cases involved the ade-
quacy of the proposed IEP, whereas in T.A. 's case the school 
district failed to provide an IEP at all, the Majority found the 
differences "insignificant." The Court explained that its 
analysis in Burlington and Carter depended not on the "par-
ticular facts of the case," but on the "language and purpose 
of the Act" itself (Forest Grove, 2009, p. 2491). The Court 
considered failing to propose an IEP to be just as serious as 
failing to provide an adequate one; therefore, the same rea-
soning applied. The only question was the effect, if any, of 
the 1997 IDEA amendments. 
The Supreme Court found that the 1997 amendments to 
IDEA did not alter the text of§ 1415(1 )(2)(C)(iii), which it 
previously held in Burlington gives courts broad authority to 
grant "appropriate" relief and that §1412(a)(10)(C) did not 
affect its meaning. To read otherwise, the Court found, 
would be contrary to the Act's purpose of providing all chil-
dren with disabilities with a FAPE and IDEA's "child find" 
obligation to identify, locate, and evaluate all children with 
TABLE 6 
Circuit 
Second Circuit 
Second Circuit 
Eleventh Circuit 
First Circuit 
Circuits Split on tuition reimbursement unless a student previously 
received special education services pre Forest Grove v. T.A. 
Citation 
Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 20961 
(2d Cir. 2006) 
Frank G. v. Board of Ed. of Hyde Park, 459 F. 3d 356 
(2d Cir. 2006) 
M. M. v. School Bd. of Miami-Dade Cty., Fla., 
437 F. 3d 1085, 1099 (11th Cir. 2006) 
Greenland School Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F. 3d 150, 159-160 
(1st Cir. 2004) 
Ruling 
§ 1412(a)(1 O)(C)(ii)* does not bar 
reimbursement 
§1412(a)(1 O)(C)(ii) does not bar 
reimbursement 
§1412(a)(1 O)(C)(ii) bars 
reimbursement 
§1412(a)(1 O)(C)(ii) bars 
reimbursement 
Note. In the IDEA Amendments of 1997, reimbursement was not allowed unless a child has "previously received special education 
or related services under the [school's] authority" (IDEA, § 1412(a)(] O)(C)(ii)). 
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disabilities. The Court felt that excusing school districts that 
refused to find children eligible for special education "would 
produce a rule bordering on irrational" (pp. 2494-2495). 
The school district maintained that it was entitled to 
notice under the Spending Clause. The Court, however, dis-
tinguished its holding in the Arlington v. Murphy (2006) 
expert fees case, noting that districts accepting IDEA funds 
expressly agree to provide a FAPE to all children with dis-
abilities and, furthermore, that states have been on notice 
that IDEA authorizes reimbursement for private school 
tuition since its decision in Burlington ( 1985). 
The Court also rejected as "unfounded" the financial bur-
den argument of both the school district and the dissent that 
parents would be encouraged to enroll their children in pri-
vate school without cooperating with school districts (p. 
2496). In doing so, the Supreme Court outlined the criteria 
for private school tuition reimbursement under IDEA: A 
court or hearing officer must conclude that the school district 
failed to provide a FAPE and that the private school place-
ment was proper under the Act and must consider all relevant 
factors in determining the amount of reimbursement, includ-
ing the notice provided by the parents and the school dis-
trict's opportunity to evaluate the child. In fact, subsection 
(iii) of § l 4 l 2(a)( 1 O)(C) entitled "Limitation on Reimburse-
ment," specifically allows for a reduction in the amount 
reimbursed for the cost of private school when parents do not 
provide proper notice of the private school placement or do 
not cooperate with the school in evaluating the child. 
The Supreme Court therefore concluded that, given these 
criteria, reimbursement for the cost of private school special 
education services may be awarded under IDEA "regardless 
of whether the child previously received special education 
or related services through the public school" (p. 2496). 
CONCLUSION 
In its latest special education decision, the Supreme Court 
in Forest Grove v. T.A. (2009) emphasized the responsibility 
of school districts to identify and evaluate students who may 
require special education and related services. The situation 
addressed by the Court in Forest Grove also further illus-
trates the necessity of effective communication and cooper-
ation between school district personnel and parents in 
accomplishing IDEA's purpose-to provide a free appropri-
ate public education for all children with disabilities. 
Twenty-five years later, it has been argued that the 
explicit purpose of the current IDEA has outgrown the Row-
ley decision and that, given the unlikelihood that the U.S. 
Supreme Court will revisit the meaning of appropriate, the 
U.S. Department of Education should provide a clear federal 
definition of appropriate in its implementing regulations 
(Blau, 2007). Congress has not sought to define appropriate 
per se in its amendments to IDEA, nor did the Department 
of Education do so in its final regulations implementing 
IDEA's 2004 amendments (71 Fed Reg. 46540, at 46706). 
Short of a legislative attempt at clarifying the meaning of 
appropriate, however, the 2007 U.S. Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Winklelman v. Parma City School District that parents 
have independent, enforceable rights under IDEA has been 
hailed as both a victory for parental rights and as an expan-
sion or refinement by the Court of the definition of a FAPE 
(Yell et al. , 2009; Wright & Wright, 2007). The Winkelman 
decision has been described as the "pendulum swinging 
back to protect parents" by the Supreme Court returning to 
the "roots of the IDEA" (Wright & Wright, 2007). 
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